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Abstract 
 
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) implemented lustration procedures. Ukraine was not among these 
countries, as it took until 2014 to pass any laws regarding lustration, or any other 
aspects of how the state would deal with or sanction former KGB agents or informers.  
Building on existing theoretical models for explaining lustration policies in CEE, this 
work develops an analytical framework that clearly identifies two sets of factors, 
namely structural and elite-actor-based factors, and their relative value for explaining 
the absence or failure of lustration legislation in Ukraine at two critical moments in 
time: right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991-1993) and after the Orange 
Revolution (2004-2006). The study thus engages in an intro-case comparison and uses 
the method of process-tracing to track and explain the development of actor decisions 
and elites behaviour in the broad context of political events. The main data for the study 
was collected from documents of the Ukrainian parliament and its media archives. The 
study concludes that the failure of the Ukrainian political elite to adopt lustration 
measures akin to other CEE states during the first window of opportunity (the 
immediate transition period around 1991) can be best explained by structural factors. 
While some of these still apply later, the post-2004 failure to engage in lustration is best 
explained by via actor-based explanations. Moreover, the analysis of parliamentary 
debates and public (media) reports demonstrates that the very term “lustration” 
underwent considerable semantic changes, increasingly shedding its original meaning to 
denote all kinds of anti-corruption measures in contemporary Ukraine.  
 
(English, 51 pages) 
Keywords: Transitional justice, post-Soviet Ukraine, Transitional justice Eastern 
Europe Countries, transition of Ukraine, decommunisation, lustration, lustration failure.
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INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union added a number of newly independent states to 
political maps of Europe. These new states of Central and Eastern Europe faced a 
number of questions: how to deal with their totalitarian past, how to treat collaborators 
and the leadership of newly defunct communist regimes, what to do with the victims of 
these regimes’ crimes and how to lead societies to reconciliation. Although each post-
Communist country had its own unique political situation, they could be classified into 
several groups sharing common characteristics. Several countries, – the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and the Baltic States, – implemented various transitional justice 
measures, including lustration, very soon after getting independence. Others, – 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania – adopted these measures more slowly, but the answers 
to the questions given above remain a topic of discussion in political discourse. One 
sees an opposite situation in the category that includes Russia, Ukraine and Moldova 
(Stan, 2009, p. 9). Here, the question of transitional justice in general, and lustration in 
particular, were sometimes raised, but not seriously considered in the political agenda. 
Thus, although the story of the unsuccessful lustration process in post-Soviet Ukraine is 
not unique, it can be a good source of analysis and can help better understand lustration. 
On August, 24, 1991, the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was adopted. 
It was followed by the adoption of a new constitution in 1996, Article 1 of which 
proclaims Ukraine as a “sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based 
state” (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Its politics has been largely democratic, though 
Freedom House scores it as a “partly free” for the 1995–97 time period (HOPF, 2002, p. 
403).  At the same time, very poor transitional justice measures were applied – for 
example, neither lustration was attempted and nor were any special lustration 
modifications to the legislation made after the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2014 
(Horne, 2011, p. 412). In 2004, a series of events, later named the “Orange Revolution,” 
took place as the result of anti-government mass protests. The protesters won, and their 
leader, Victor Yuschenko, was elected President, while other opposition members were 
elected into the government and later – into parliament. Still, all lustration projects 
failed to be adopted in the parliament, resulting in the protraction of poor to non-
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existent vetting procedures.  
This research focuses on two time periods: the first, starting immediately after the 
independence of 1991, and the second, after the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. These 
time frames were chosen based on the concept of “window of opportunity” explained 
below. The first researched period starts from years 1989, the year of the first 
convocation of the Verkhovna Rada, and 1991, when the Declaration of Independence 
was adopted, until the year 2003. This time period covers the presidencies of Kravchuk 
and Kuchma. The duration of the second period is from 2004, the events of “The 
Orange Revolution”, until 2013 and covers the offices of Presidents Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych. Ukraine is still (as of 2016) dealing with the question of lustration and 
decommunisation. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been struggling with the 
Lustration Law since 2014.  
The focus of this paper will be on both the historical-structural constellations that 
prevented policy-makers from engaging in major administrative reform in both phases, 
and on the elites, where we follow an actor-centred analysis of the political processes 
that resulted in the protraction of lustration in Ukraine. Moreover, in comparing two 
critical junctions in the Ukrainian democratization process, after independence and after 
the events of the “Orange Revolution,” this project aims to trace the dynamic 
relationship between both structural and elite-centred factors and their relative 
importance in each period. It will be systematically attempted to establish a basic causal 
relationship between structural conditions, which created an accordant political situation 
in the country; elite politics, the decisions of political leaders who made key important 
actions; and the fail of the lustration project in Ukraine after independence was 
proclaimed. Hence, the research question of this paper will be the following: Which 
factors influenced on the failure of lustration adoption after 1991 and after 2004 more – 
structural conditions or elite behaviour? 
For the purposes of such qualitative research some necessary tasks should be solved. 
First of all, it is necessary to analyse current theoretical approaches in the fields of 
transitional justice in general and of lustration in particular. Second, theoretical models 
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conceived to explain implemented transitional justice measures in EECs will be applied 
to explain the absence of vetting or purging procedures in Ukraine in this study. Finally, 
the main task is data and document collection on lustration discourse in Ukrainian 
parliamentary debates, and interpreting them in a specific political context. 
The topic of transitional justice in Ukraine is under-represented in literature. Only a few 
researchers have studied such aspects as the process of decommunisation, the evolution 
of political institutes, and the situation of democracy in Ukraine. Along these lines, 
Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson have published numerous articles and monographs 
about the transition of Ukraine from communism following independence, with deep 
analysis of the new political system. However, there has been no systematic research on 
transitional justice in Ukraine, and no unified research on why Ukraine did not execute 
transitional justice measures and lustration activity until 2014. In this work, this 
information gap is filled with empirical observations and by summarizing the 
conclusions of respectable scholars, media archives, and parliament proceedings 
(including transcripts of plenary sessions, proposed bills, public debates). These sources 
are far from being exhaustive, but they facilitate finding answers to the research 
question. 
This master thesis consists of three chapters. The first one is dedicated to a general 
theoretical overview: what is the meaning of the term “lustration,” how different 
scholars have explained it, what theoretical approaches they used, why this measure was 
implemented in a number of post-Soviet Eastern European countries, and what 
contradictions arose during its adoption and implementation. This overview creates the 
image of a hypothetical reality – what could have been done in post-Soviet Ukraine, if 
lustration had been given the chance to be conducted. In the second, methodological, 
chapter, the research question and case selection with limitations are presented. Here 
one can find how the main research method – process tracing – was exploited, and how 
research was conceptualised and operationalised. The final, chapter presents the 
empirical findings of this research. Here, data from the media, other scholars’ findings 
and analysis of the transcripts of parliament sessions, forms a narrative of lustration 
discourse and elites decisions on the landscape of Ukraine’s political development.  
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1. BASIC CONCEPTS AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
 
In this part of the thesis, different terminological definitions and understandings of 
lustration will be described, the controversy of this phenomenon discussed, and, finally, 
some practical aspects and theoretical approaches to the lustration process explored. 
Over the last few decades, a great deal of research has been published about various 
aspects of transitional justice. There are extensive databases1 and theoretical analyses 
concerning different aspects of transitional justice. These factors, or “elements”, 
influenced the process of transition from the past totalitarian system to democracy in 
Ukraine in general and lustration in particular. 
1.1 Lustration: The Roots of the Term 
 
The development of the term “lustration” took its roots in ancient times, when Roman 
rulers changed their entourage after coming to power, it was primarily a ritual and 
symbolic act of cleansing. The word itself comes from the Latin “lustrate”, a 
demonstrative sacrificing or purification, which could be applied to a person or a place 
(Oxford English Dictionary). Later, this term took on a new and more administrative 
application – as a mechanism of transitional justice intended to deal with the crimes of 
the past, to reform a totalitarian system of governance, and to create the basis for social 
trust towards a newly created, democratic system. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, this measure of transitional justice received new life in Eastern and Central 
Europe as a tool to disempower the nomenklatura and collaborators with communist 
security forces.  
There is a degree of uncertainty regarding terminology in transitional justice, especially 
regarding the term “lustration”. The above-mentioned historical context led to the 
perception of lustration as roughly synonymous with the “decommunisation”. Williams 
and others note, however, that the difference lies in the definition of the circle of people 
                                                
1  For example, The Transitional Justice Data Base Project. It was began at the University of 
Wisconsin in 2005, and is run by three political scientists: Leigh A. Payne, Tricia D. Olsen, and Andrew 
G. Reiter. Home page available at: https://sites.google.com/site/transitionaljusticedatabase/home  
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who are the objects of a new law. Thus, lustration is performed against people who were 
officers and collaborators of the secret services, and former high-ranked Communist 
Party members. Decommunisation, however, is connected with the wider removal of 
everyone who took part in a communist party, including those at lower levels (Williams, 
Fowler and Szczerbiak, 2005). Adam Czarnota further expands the scope of 
decommunisation and applies it to all political and legal strategies with the goal of 
destruction of the legacies of communism in a social and political system that covers 
both a narrower conception of decommunisation (focussing on elimination of 
personnel), and lustration (focussing on informers) (Czarnota, 2009, p. 308). 
Nevertheless, the most quotable definition of Wojciech Sadurski stipulates that, 
”lustration” applies to the screening of persons seeking to occupy (or actually 
occupying) certain public positions for evidence of involvement with the communist 
regime (mainly with the secret security apparatus), while “decommunisation” refers to 
the exclusion of certain categories of ex-communist officials from the right to run for, 
and occupy, certain public positions in the new system” (Sadurski, 2003, p. 4). The 
author notes immediately afterwards, though, that in general perception, the 
justifications of both concepts have been largely merged.  
In addition to differences on the level of the subjects of the two concepts, Lavinia Stan 
also emphasizes differences on the procedural level, pointing out that at the end of the 
1990s, there were two different procedures referred to by the same name (Stan, 2013, p. 
84). She discriminates between the two types of lustration in the following way. First, in 
Germany and Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, there was “an accusation-based 
procedure permitting the government to dismiss or demote selected communist decision 
makers from selected post-communist public offices” (Stan, 2013, p. 84). This 
effectively meant firing or demoting people who were occupying high positions in a 
communist party or state agencies such as the army, police, and secret services (Stan, 
2013, p. 84). Second, in Hungary in 1994 and Poland in 1997, a procedure for voluntary 
confession of past acts that led to release only in exceptional cases was implemented, 
under which persons who had cooperated with the secret police and kept this secret, 
were denounced (Stan, 2013, p. 84). it is important to keep in mind that there are two 
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levels (or facets) of lustration as a transitional justice measure – institutional (Horne, 
2009, p. 714) and symbolic (Pettai& Pettai, 2015, p. 33). 
For his part, Czarnota describes three phenomena that could be referred to as lustration. 
The first is classical vetting, in which candidates for certain state positions are checked 
for having worked in or with security services. The second is making such collaboration 
publicly known. Third is actual decommunisation, removing people who held state 
positions or were members of a communist party's apparatus from the political scene 
(Czarnota, 2009, p. 311).   
Finally, the most general definition might be the one given by Cynthia M. Horne, who 
views lustration as a subset of “employment vetting, designed to either remove or 
prevent from assuming public office those persons who collaborated with the previous 
communist regime or secret security services” (Horne, 2009. p. 714).  This generalized 
definition sketches the range of the meaning of the lustration phenomenon and 
associated actions, to be considered in this thesis as lustration measure. 
1.2 Controversies of Lustration  
 
The phenomenon of lustration is, by its very nature, highly controversial at both 
theoretical and practical levels. Mark Ellis argues that the process of implementation of 
lustration is mainly politically motivated and recognises other motives at work as well, 
such as, “a desire for accountability, restitution, rehabilitation, and even revenge” (Ellis, 
1996, p. 196). A number of post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe applied lustration at 
different times and in different ways. Based on their experience could be modulate the 
perspectives of lustration implementation. This is something like “alternative reality” 
for post-Soviet transition of Ukraine – that if lustration was adopted after independence 
proclamation or after the Orange Revolution. 
Why to Apply Lustration 
The positive effects from lustration could be divided into three main groups: dealing 
with the past, the present, and working for the future. The first group has, as its main 
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goal, dealing with the past, as a society cannot move forward until it faces its past 
(Krtolica, 2014, p. 4). This means that the crimes of previous regime should be 
declassified, made public and punished appropriately. The importance of this is justified 
by the need to “satisfy victims” feelings of justice regarding past crimes how they are 
perceived, and to achieve reconciliation.  Archival access is crucially important in this 
context, as it opens the way to using documents classified under the previous regime as 
evidence in the lustration process (Krtolica, 2014, p. 6). 
The second group of factors calls for working in the present to create new democratic 
institutions. The process of creating a new democratic system is problematic when 
executed by politicians and functionaries who have close relationships with the secret 
services of previous totalitarian regimes (UN, 2006, 2). Furthermore, the credibility of 
society to the new institutions with “old faces” could be negative.  
The final group is working for the future. The question is not as much the competence 
and (in)effectiveness of past officials, as their moral values and motivations. 
Accordingly, lustration represents a way to purify public administration, so that only 
competent and moral civil servants who respect democratic values and have no debts to 
the previous regime remain to work for it. Supporters of lustration expect that its 
implementation will lead to a growing perception of legitimacy towards newly created 
authorities.  
Lustration’s Difficulties and Risks  
If the arguments in favour of lustration are quite typical and are shared to some extent, 
the cons of lustration programs are quite specific and demonstrate the potential 
contradictions of these measures. The first and the most evident aspect is the issue of the 
impermissibility of retroactive punishment (Krtolica, 2014; Horne, 2009). However, the 
exceptional character of crimes (against the Declaration of Human Rights) and 
democratic changes in the countries, forced the European Court of Human Rights to 
reject this argument and to punish criminals from previous regimes (Horne, 2009). One 
can find research in this direction in the works of Horne: for example, in one article she 
examines the legal practice of international bodies (the European Court of Human 
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Rights and the International Labour Organization), when they consider lustration laws 
of different countries and “have interpreted rule-of-law versus justice concerns” (Horne, 
2009, p. 713). Horne concludes that institutions are mostly concentrated on “fair 
implementation, not the legality, of lustration laws” (Horne, 2009, p. 713). The second 
big problem that could emerge – the high risk of incomplete and opaque way of 
evidence collection. Problematic issues range from the sources and circumstances of 
data collection, to the way they are presented and evaluated. Some practical aspects of 
complications with archives and old documents will be discussed further. The third, 
where to find enough professional staff not affiliated with the previous regime. The final 
big problem that lustration efforts face is the possibility of abuse by a ruling party 
seeking leverage to use against political opponents. Many authors warn that lustration 
beings with it the danger of political discrediting and revenge (Ellis, 1996, p. 196). 
1.3 Pragmatic Issues Determining Lustration Process Pathways  
 
There have been numerous attempts to systematize research in lustration as a 
transitional justice measure in a general framework or as a separate phenomenon. If our 
goal is to identify common patterns of success and failure in different countries, then the 
following question should be asked: how can the political situation in countries in 
general, and political forces in particular, influence this process?  
Similarly, the factors that influence the effectiveness of the lustration process can be 
divided into practical and theoretical levels. These levels concern the question of how 
successful and effective a lustration process is, and whether the results are primarily 
positive or negative. The following practical factors belong to the first group 
(theoretical levels). First of all are regulations and their principles and concepts. Here, a 
legislature must answer the following questions: What kind of law will be adopted? 
What kind of process will be initiated, vetting or purges? Who is covered by the new 
policy? Who makes related decisions? What results are authorized (e.g., people being 
declared unelectable, or a more complete ban on political activity?) Is there any “back 
door”, i.e. the possibility to come out voluntary about participation in the previous 
regime and ward off some measures such as public confession? The next factors are 
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what real actions, stages, and steps are required for the implementation of adopted laws. 
Naturally, differences are to be expected between what a law calls for, and how it is 
actually implemented. 
One of the essential aspects of realising lustration is its material basis, technical-
organisational issues regarding the creation of special commissions. A number of 
questions are raised in this area: who such commissions will be composed of, what their 
tasks should be, what are the criteria for decision making, and what their scope of 
influence is. Even the method of publication (reporting) of the results can be an 
important part of making the lustration process open and fair. The core element of most 
lustration processes in Eastern Europe – the opening of archives – contains a number of 
threats and questions that should be investigated carefully. For example, how to open an 
archive? Partly, or totally, and how does this endanger citizens' privacy and publicises 
their personal data? How can fabricated cases be prevented, and opened information not 
used for blackmail? 
The next important aspect of lustration implementation is the implementation of 
efficient mechanisms to provide checks and balances, a necessary means of 
guaranteeing the legality of the process. These could be national constitutional courts, or 
international organisations and control bodies (e.g. decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the International Labour Organisation, UN, or the European Council). 
Even pressure from a partner state can serve this role. 
Finally, the results of the law are difficult to assess or measure in all aspects of this 
phenomenon, but some specific conclusions can be defined. For example: the number of 
people whose actions were covered under this law; experts' opinions (such as lawyers' 
conclusions and politicians' declarations); the societal reactions (public perceptions, 
polls, and sometimes election results); international recognition; and generally, the level 
of democratisation (as measured, for example according to the indices of Freedom 
House’s Human Rights Watch). 
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To summarise this part, it should be emphasized that practical aspects of lustration law 
and its implementation are essential parts of the transition process. As there were no 
such results in Ukraine until 2014, these factors will be analysed in order to find out 
why they did not work in this case. 
1.4 Theoretical Frameworks 
 
The following section discusses theoretical approaches to different aspects and factors 
that influenced the lustration process itself and, furthermost, its initiation, what 
frameworks were created, and how to combine them with new ideas in this field. The 
majority of researchers in transitional justice science, grounded their conclusions in the 
transition experience of EECs that had actually taken place. They identified a range of 
factors in a country's political situation, which had determined the adoption of 
transitional justice measure and their implementation. In contrast, in the empirical part 
of this thesis, the same theoretical framework of these explanatory factors will be used 
for the case of lustration policy that failed to occur. 
For this brief discussion, I will adopt the categorization of determinants proposed by 
Helga Welsh, who differentiates between factors that may be characterized as relating to 
the “politics of the past” and those better described as ”politics of the present” (Welsh, 
1996, p. 414). Among the former, could be found mostly historical-structural conditions 
such as the character of the previous regime, and the mode of previous regime collapse 
and elite extrication from power (also called legacy factors). Among the latter, both 
structural factors of present politics (such as emerging party cleavages) and more actor-
centred factors come into play. Additionally, the role of such universal structural 
parameters such as legacy, time, historical context, and the economic background of the 
transition process will be explained. 
There are a number of scientists who have explained why and how new democracies 
deal with the past. The first among them was Huntington, who researched what he 
called the “mode of exit,” and particularly - the role of elite bargains. As a result of 
studying the interconnections between these two areas, he declared, “If the last leaders 
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of the non-democratic regime had to be ousted, then there would be a desire for 
retribution. If they gave up peacefully following revolts or initiated reform themselves 
and stepped down once those reforms went beyond the initial intention, then persecution 
would be eschewed” (Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak, 2005, p. 23). Thus, the nature 
of the transition - violent or peaceful - determines the future course of reforms. 
The next author discussed here is Moran, who based his framework on the historical 
explanation. He argues that the reconstruction of the old regime shows us how liberal it 
was in permitting dissent. He makes a conclusion that “if a regime did not allow citizens 
to voice discontent or emigrate, then there would be more pressure for settling scores” 
(Moran, 1994, p. 101; Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak, 2005, p. 24). Therefore, in a 
state where it is legal to express discontent through protests, ideas of revenge will have 
less popularity (Williams, Fowler and Szczerbiak, 2005, p. 24). 
The third approach, Welsh’s multi-causal model, developed a useful system of factors 
(Welsh, 1996, p. 419). Welsh provides a general overview of factor groups, but 
unfortunately does not give a clear explanation of each factor in the group. This work 
uses a modified version of this system in order to carefully analyse each factor involved 
in the Ukrainian case study. It will be described in more details in later subchapter. 
Welsh divides factors that influence policy choices into two major groups: politics of 
the past or background factors and politics of the present. The former includes the level 
of political oppression, the role of state security, and modes of transition. It is further 
divided into contextual factors (contagion effects across societal sectors; value 
orientation; external events; cross-national diffusion effects; and international law), and 
the political setting (the strength of post-communist political forces; polarisation of the 
political landscape; and institutional set-up) (Welsh, 1996, p. 419).  Partially, these 
factors will be detailed in empirical part of thesis with the application to the Ukrainian 
case. The schematic form of this framework can be found on Figure 1. 
Politics of the past. These politics concern historical legacies, past atrocities, secrets and 
crimes of previous regimes, the character of communist parties before transition, the 
way of political system is changing, and finally, societal collective trauma. According to 
18 
Welsh, in past political perspectives, modes of transition are usually “distinguished 
according to the process through which incumbents are replaced by opposition forces” 
(Welsh, 1994, p. 379). She also argues that in this aspect of transition, the “concept of 
bargaining” plays an important role for understanding phenomena (Welsh, 1994, p. 
379). Welsh’s hypothesis is that “the period of extrication from authoritarian regimes 
are characterized by a switch from command and imposition to bargaining and 
compromise” (Welsh, 1994, p. 379). 
 
Figure 1 
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Similar approaches can find in researches, such as in Horn's discussion of the historical 
context of transition. She argues that historical context matters in both “the 
conceptualization of democracy and implementation of rule of law in post-communist 
countries” (Horne, 2009, p. 716). Politics of the past create the structural background 
for further events in the present time and for political calculations of elites. 
Politics of the present. These are characteristics which are determined by the current 
political situation and its changes within a country after transition begins. They also 
contain more situational aspects such as governmental decisions and political directions. 
One such aspect “political polarisation,” is illustrated by Welsh's quote: “The electoral 
successes of those parties [former communist] have ensured that a number of former 
communist party officials are once again in positions of power. On the one hand, this 
means there are no extensive purges or retroactive legislation. On the other, however, it 
has also contributed to political polarisation” (Welsh, 1996, p. 421).  
Many researchers pay attention to such dimensions as the “time of transition” or period 
of transition (not only the time of the beginning, but also the duration). This category is 
difficult to operate with or to align it to any politics (past or present) in this scheme 
(Figure 1). At the same time, this parameter could not be avoided, as it is of crucial 
importance in this case. There is one more important aspect to transitional periods – 
critical junctures. Monika Nalepa, analysing the case of Poland, created a scheme that is 
useful in working with current political patterns. She distinguishes three critical 
moments: “The pre-transition stage, when the communist party is in charge and various 
dissident groups start getting organized. The transition stage, during which the 
communists sit together with the opposition at roundtables to negotiate transitions to 
democracy based on an exchange: the amnesty for outgoing autocrats for free or semi-
free democratic elections. The post-transition stage, during which the deals struck at the 
roundtable are enforced or broken” (Nalepa, 2010, p. 4). 
As for the appropriate time for the beginning of lustration, there is little disagreement in 
the literature. In Welsh's words, the best time for this is “in the immediate aftermath of 
the transition, when memories of the ancien regime are vivid and demand for settling 
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accounts is most pressing” (Nalepa, 2010, p. 2) - the so-called “window of opportunity.” 
At the same time, Lavinia Stan emphasises that, "many post-communist countries have 
implemented transitional justice well beyond this limited time frame” (Stan, 2013, p. 3).  
There is one more aspect initially mentioned by Welsh and further developed by 
Nalepa. In her book “Skeletons in the Closet” Nalepa focused on the questions of who 
decides to lustrate, when these choices are made, and why (Nalepa, 2010, p. 28). Hence, 
the position of the author is more concentrated on particular actors and their political 
decisions, or, in her words, the “strategic choices of politicians” (Nalepa, 2010, p. 28). 
Nalepa is convinced that lustration “remains a salient political issue with politicians 
even when voters have no particular concern with the authoritarian past anymore” 
(Nalepa, 2010, p. 10).  When this occurs, and politicians return in their political 
programme or rhetoric to questions of transitional justice long after a political transition 
has otherwise ended, this is referred to by researchers as “post-transitional justice” 
(Raimundo, 2013). Such an aspect could be assigned to the actors-centric factors that 
determine lustration processes (Raimundo, 2013). 
The narrative of most of these politics and their causal factors in Ukraine will be 
described in the first part of this thesis’ empirical chapter. In the following chapter, a 
hypothesised predominance of either structural or elites factors will be analysed over 
two periods which started with the opening of two windows of opportunity – in 1991 
with independence, and in 2004 with the Orange Revolution. 
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, the methodology and research question of this thesis will be presented. 
First, the criteria for case selection and the main limitations of research will be outlined. 
This will be followed by conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dependent 
variable. Finally, the methods employed in this project’s empirical research will be 
thoroughly explained. 
2.1 Research Design and Case Selection 
 
Research on the development of such aspects of transition as facilitating initiatives with 
respect to the right to truth, and to institutional reforms, shows that there were some 
clear attempts, in the very beginning of the independence and after the Orange 
Revolution, to solve most of the important questions regarding transition, and some 
important steps were undertaken. However, this promising beginning perished due to 
political struggles, the personal interests of leaders, and the bureaucratic red-tape of the 
newly created (or reformed) state, resulting in a far from perfect system. The primary 
aim of this study is to find out which factors most contributed to this lack of 
institutional reforms and, more precisely, the implementation of any lustration during 
both the initial phase and the period after the Orange Revolution.  
In this single case study, the development of the political situation in Ukraine and the 
emergence of the issue of lustration on this background will be traced. To assess the 
impact of structural elements and personal decisions of elites, comparative analysis of 
different decades of political life of Ukraine will be conducted. In other words, “intra-
case comparison” or “natural experiments over time” analysis of the Ukrainian situation 
in different periods will be conducted (Grodsky, 2010, p. 80). 
The main mission of this work is to develop the study of transition in Ukraine and to 
embed it in the broader conceptual framework of transitional justice in post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe. As a single-country study, one of the goals of comparison – context 
description – is to demonstrate the landscape of the political events and decisions 
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(Landman, 2008, p. 86). The second is to classify the reasons for such tendencies and 
make analytical conclusions. 
2.2 Conceptualisation and Operationalisation 
In this section, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the main research 
question will be discussed. Based on the comparative analysis of several decades of 
Ukraine history, this study will attempt to draw a conclusion on the factors that 
influence the adoption of lustration. 
Conceptualisation 
Ukraine’s transition, especially its lustration process, can be as an example of a 
unsuccessful attempts. Despite 23 years of independence, the Ukrainian parliament was 
unable to adopt any lustration laws, and all related negotiations have fell. Hence, it is 
necessary to conceptualise the phenomenon of “unsuccess” or “failure” of the lustration 
process in Ukraine, and to distinguish what factors led to such a situation. They will be 
identified with the facts of failure of the lustration law adoption in parliament, and its 
final adoption (yes/no). 
Operationalisation 
The manner in which changes will be examined can be seen in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
 
 
 
Why? 
After independence After the Orange Revolution 
IV1: Structural conditions IV1: Structural conditions 
IV2: Actor-elite politics IV2: Actor-elite politics 
 
DV: “Failed lustration”  
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Dependent variable (DV) - “failure” or “unsuccess” of the lustration process in post-
Soviet Ukraine - the fact that after independence, Ukraine did not manage to begin the 
process transitional justice, as was typical for post-communist Eastern Europe countries, 
in the form of lustration or other kinds of vetting. The only exception was the temporary 
banning of the Communist party in 1991.  
Taking into account Welsh’s framework, combined with additional factors, the failure 
of lustration from the perspectives of structural conditions (independent variable 1, IV1) 
and of actors' or elites' behaviour in politics (independent variable 2, IV2) will be 
explained. The main comparison will be done in two time dimensions - two time 
periods after “windows of opportunity”- after independence and the Orange Revolution. 
These are “taxonomic dimensions” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 23) are useful for 
process tracing. As noted by Bennett and Checkel, “Structural constraints can be 
material, institutional, or normative, for example, and agents can be motivated by 
rational calculations of material interests, cognitive biases, emotional drives, or 
normative concerns” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 23). 
2.3 Method 
 
This work employs the qualitative method of process tracing, which focuses on 
monitoring a variety of factors which influence on the order of events, actions, and 
facts, then finding their interconnections and cross influence. As mentioned above, the 
main advantage of this method is that it comprehensively examines the structural 
(material) circumstances of individual actions, actor decision-making, and personal 
choices – casual explanation via reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms” 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 3).  
In other words, the “intra-case comparison” will be employed, that is the “natural 
experiments over time” (Grodsky, 2010, p. 80), analysis of the Ukrainian situation in 
different time frames. As George and Bennet explained, the “process tracing method 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal 
mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the 
dependant variable” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 3).  
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Data 
In this thesis, the empirical research based on combination of theoretical conclusions, 
parliament documents, and media reports. Media reviews are an important source for 
analysing the development of the political situation in Ukraine, as they collect the 
speeches and statements of such actors as presidents and prime minister.  
The official web pages of the parliament (Verkhovna Rada), the President, and of the 
other governmental structures, are an essential resource for official information and 
documents. The Verkhovna Rada’s  webpage, which has transcriptions of all sessions 
and meetings of the parliament, working documents in process, law projects, and final 
legislative acts, was the main source of data for this thesis (official web portal)2. The 
transcripts of records of parliament sessions contain speeches of deputies from different 
years starting from 1989, which have been collected and contextually analysed. As the 
website’s search feature is not fully functional, and can only search for full words, the 
main query phrase used for this project was “lustration” (люстрація), with various rich 
morphological endings (i.e. люстр-ація, -ацію, -ації, -ацій, -увати). 
At first glance, it may seem that since 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament was not interested 
in the question of lustration, with the exception of a few pro-democratic factions. 
However, a careful keyword search in parliamentary proceeding debate transcripts 
reveals that the question was raised repeatedly through the sessions of the Verkhovna 
Rada by various deputies affiliated with different political forces (Table 2). Drafts for 
the lustration process show up several times on the parliamentary agenda for discussion. 
However, appearances of the word “lustration” during the sessions of the Verkhovna 
Rada do not accurately reflect support for this idea within the Ukrainian Parliament, but 
merely show that the term came up in debates. It also reveals the identities of the 
speakers, their political affiliations, and the authors of pro-lustration proposals, and their 
opponents.  
Although experiments were conducted with using other keywords, such as “KGB,” 
“cleaning power,” “nomenklatura,” and “decommunisation,” these keywords were 
                                                
2  Available at: http://rada.gov.ua/en [Accessed 19.05.2016] 
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ultimately not used for this project, as too many results were not relevant to transitional 
justice (and the numbers of mentions are not representative). However, partial findings 
of this search will be used as a additional evidence for lustration discourse analysis to 
supplement the general transitional justice picture. 
As this work’s main method of analysis is process tracing, it will be not included 
context analysis of deputy speeches. We only list the mentions, in various forms, of the 
term “lustration” uttered in the parliamentary assembly hall, along with brief 
characteristics of the circumstances of these cases, and illustrative quotes for some 
statements. Transcripts of the sessions are used solely as additional evidence for 
episodic discussions of lustration during the law-making process. In the Table 1 one can 
see the parliament serial number, session count, and corresponding time frames, as well 
as the accumulated number of mentions of different forms of the word “lustration” 
(involving different morphological case endings and parts of speech). 
Table 2 
The number of mentions of the word 
“lustration” during the sessions of Verkhovna 
Rada 
Parliament 
(скликання) 
Count of 
sessions 
Time 
Frame 
Total  
Mentions 
    І 9 1991-1994 0 
    ІІ 9 1994-1998 3 
    ІІІ 9 1998-2002 2 
    ІV 9 2002-2006 24 
    V 4* 2006-2007 0 
    VI 11 2007-2012 13 
    VII 5 2012-2014** 11 
    * President dissolved the parliament 
 ** for this research we are taking into 
account the time till the end of 2013 
year, when Maidan events started in 
Kyiv 
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Limitations 
That is not the first time the topic of transitional justice in Ukraine has been raised. 
Numerous researchers, including Kuzio, Wilson, D'Aaneri, and Åslund, have devoted 
their time to issues of government after Ukraine's independence. Anders Åslund is 
considered a renowned expert on Ukraine's economic development, and related political 
and social processes (Åslund and McFaul, 2006; Åslund, 2011; Åslund 2015). Andrew 
Wilson mainly works on issues of political parties, their classification, and behaviour 
during the electoral process (Wilson and Bilous, 1993). Their findings and evidence are 
a valuable resource of empirical data and will be used in third chapter of this master’s 
thesis. 
In his works, Taras Kuzio considers the whole political system through its dynamic 
development and changes, including the specifics of the transition from communism. 
For example, in the article “Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of 
Ukraine” he highlights and describes “three areas of theory into Ukraine's transition, the 
importance of path dependence, pacted compromises and the national question” (Kuzio, 
2007, p. 293). However, these studies are shallower in nature and describe the general 
situation without delving deeper into various elements of the theory of transitional 
justice. There is an additional problem connected with the theoretical method chosen for 
this research. As Bennet and Checkel explain, “...even if the world is deterministic, we 
observe it as probabilistic because of measurement error and specification error, 
including the omission to important variables from our models” (Bennett and Checkel, 
2015, p. 14). 
The main limitation of present work is their poor primary sources. All findings are 
mainly based on secondary resources, primarily the conclusions of transitional justice 
theorists and researchers of the Ukrainian situation and the dynamics of its 
development. Transcripts of parliamentary sessions used in this project were found in 
the Internet archives of the Verkhovna Rada via its official web portal3.  VR’s publicly 
accessible online archive has only rudimentary search capabilities. For example, it is not 
                                                
3  Available at: http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr [Accessed 16.05.2016] 
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possible to submit a query with a part of the word; only complete keywords with proper 
endings are possible (what is quite problematic considering the rich morphology of the 
Ukrainian language). Thus, it is impossible to be completely certain that all records 
related to this project were found without combing through audio recordings of the 
proceedings. Unfortunately, it is impossible to find the votes of different political forces 
in the Rada, as its electronic system  has only been made public records for the latest 
two parliaments. The other gap in this research is the lack of in-person interviews with 
the key political figures of Ukraine in order to better analyse actor-centric factors. The 
ideas and positions of former presidents, prime ministers, deputies, and leaders of 
political parties will be reconstructed based on media interviews, speeches during 
plenary sessions of parliament, and the recollections of contemporaries.  
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3. EMPIRICAL STUDY: THE UKRAINIAN CASE 
 
“Believe me, over 20 years I am so fed up with questions 'Why?'. My answer to 
all is 'Because this is what we are” 4(Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian President (1991-
1994). Interview to 20th Anniversary of Independence of Ukraine) (BBC, 2011) 
3.1 The Transition to Independence 
 
This section is dedicated to the factors that are largely determined the transition process 
from a totalitarian regime and to the further development of the state policy. The 
structural factors, which in many of EECs were pre-conditions for the transitional 
justice implementation, in Ukraine did not become causal for this purpose. Moreover, as 
a result of background factors of the past politics, in the politics of present was no place 
for strong opposition that would be interested in vetting or purging. As a result, no 
lustration projects made it to the form of a law or even a draft after until the Orange 
Revolution. 
3.1.1 Structural Preconditions of 90s 
 
In the theoretical chapter we determined factors of the politics of the past or we can call 
them - background factors. They were classified as a trait of the totalitarian regime, of 
the transition mode, of the oppression level, of the secret police and opposition force 
activities. The failure of the lustration process in the post-Soviet Ukraine will be 
illustrated through the fact, that there were no opposition-submitted lustration law drafts 
at this time. 
Speaking about state building experience, it should be mentioned, that the history of 
Ukraine over more than three centuries before 1991 mostly consists of eras of foreign 
rule with the flashes of the partial independence (Kuzio, 1995, p. 8). Thus, there were 
no longer than a decade intervals of sovereign democratic experience or experience of a 
national state-building by Ukrainians. 
                                                
4  Here and by translations from Ukrainian and Russian languages made by the author of this master 
thesis. 
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In contrast to the rest of post-Soviet Eastern-European countries, the “Red Terror” in 
Ukraine started much earlier, with the war of 1918-1920, and continued since for 
decades..5 According to Walsh (1996, p. 421) and Nalepa “The longer a regime is in 
power, the harder it becomes to separate the guilty parties from the innocent” (Nalepa, 
2010, p. 7). Zubin, discussing similarities and difference in post-Communist and post-
Nazis regimes, says about Soviet Union: “There have died almost all people 
remembering life before communism. The depth of Soviet repression was so large-scale 
that it left no counter-elite” (www.dw.com, 2015).  
The secret services in Ukraine during the communist time were playing an important 
role of the “stick”6 on behalf of the ruling elite. Welsh emphasises, that in during late 
decades of Soviet-Communist rule physical violence was replaced by structural violence 
characterised by calculated intimidation and public submissiveness” (Welsh, 1996, p. 
420). Given the Imperial Russia's experience with continuous Ukrainian rebellions, 
Åslund is convinced, that “... the Soviet authorities had always been particularly afraid 
of Ukrainian nationalism, subjecting Ukraine to much more control and repressions than 
Russia or the Baltics. As a consequence, Ukraine suffered an especially great shortage 
of all nation-building skills” (Åslund, 2011, p. 376). 
In general, in the Soviet Union, the KGB's political persecutions of the Ukrainian 
intelligence declined only in 1985 with the Perestroika and politics of “glasnost”, after 
running for decades at full scale. The number of appeals and amnesties increased and 
political prisoners were coming back. At the same time the deaths and persecutions did 
not come to full stop, for example, in 1985 in the prison dies Ukrainian poet Vasylii 
Stus – one of the most active participants of Ukrainian dissident movement. This led to 
the extermination of the elite of the dissident movement. The part that survived 
                                                
5  For newly occupied EECs “red terror” was began in 1940-1950th 
6  The backbone principle of the “stick” (repression, deportation, imprisonment and murder, which 
creates in a society the atmosphere of fear and suspicious) is combined with “carrot” (economic and 
social benefits, the illusion of stability and absence of precariousness). For more information about 
character of oppressions and economic benefits see opinions, collected by Grodsky (Grodsky, 2010, p. 
59-62) 
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continued active combat against system and made a small skeleton for democratic 
opposition. 
As there was no lustration or purging process in the Ukrainian KGB after independence, 
the service underwent a simple renaming into “SBU” (for “Security Service of 
Ukraine”, “Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Ukrainy”). In order to become an officer of the new 
institution, former KGB agents were simply obligated to take an oath to the new 
country7. It is a remarkable observation that the question of what to do with the secret 
service and their agents was often a subject of discussion within the first parliament 
after the independence. The acronym KGB was used in context with all kinds of Soviet 
regime enforcement agencies, including the entire Ministry of Internal Affaires, General 
Prosecution Office and the army. Some of the former dissidents that suffered from the 
repressive secret services, insisted merely on “depoliticization” of the question of KGB 
and other services. They were speaking about special commission in parliament for 
surveillance on the KGB, but to refrain from full-scale lustration or purging 
(Luk'yanenko L.H., Holovatyy S.P, 1990). The term “decommunisation” also was used 
often as a simple synonym to depoliticization8, like “decommunisation of economy” or 
“decommunisation of farming”. Note, that the term “decommunisation” was used by the 
deputies in the meaning of as they were speaking about leading economy and 
enforcement agencies of the country from the influence of the communist party. If an 
opposition deputy happened to put forward a more critical proposal, for example, 
demolishing of Soviet monuments or street renaming (Ratushnyy, 2005), the leftist part 
of the parliament violently opposed any such initiative (“Hands off Lenin!”) under it 
was dropped (Poliit, 2005).  
The mode of transition of Ukraine to independence was gradual and peaceful. One of 
the possible reasons for this – the reaction to events on the events in Moscow of the 
Kyiv's nomenclature.  At the same time, displeasure of political and economic situation 
in countries was growing within the last decades, especially after Chernobyl catastrophe 
                                                
7  According to Anderson and Albini, the changes in name did not change the substance and 
connections with Moscow (Anderson and Albini, 1999, p. 283) 
8  Depoliticize - to cause something or someone to have no political connections. (Cambridge 
Dictionaries online) 
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(Koulinka, 2012).  During the Soviet Union, all questions were solved in Moscow, while 
Kyiv was “merely a provincial capital”  (Åslund, 2011, p. 376). The time of 
Kravchuck's presidency 1991- 1994 Kuzio even calls “stalled transition” (Kuzio, 2007, 
p. 45). 
The long period of totalitarian rule marked by repressions, pure state-building 
experience and actions of secret services in direction of destruction of any dissent 
leaders, ideas, movements, led to the situation, when Ukraine get independence 
“unexpectedly”, as a result of the events in Moscow. Thereby, the independence of 
Ukraine was a “reaction” rather than a “proaction” of society and elites. 
 
3.1.2 Post-Soviet Ukrainian Elites 
 
In previous part of the thesis, following the pattern produced in the theoretical part of 
this study, was discussed the structural conditions that led Ukraine out of the Soviet 
Union. Now, describing the circumstances of the independence of Ukraine, paying 
attention to the first elections for the presidency and parliament, we can describe 
opposition forces in the political arena of Ukraine and the balance between democratic 
opposition and “new-old red" forces. Then we follow with the question lustration and its 
discussion in Parliament by key political players (often after the fact - in memoirs, 
interviews). 
As it was mentioned in the introduction to this work, the transition of Ukraine to 
independence 1991 took place peacefully and without apparent aggravations. In the 
policy of “Glasnost and Perestroika” in the Soviet Union and active dissident 
movement, the election in 1990 the Democratic Parties won with 111 out of 442 seats. 
The Communists Party was forbidden9 and the referendum for independence in 
December 1991 was supported by 90% of the population (BBC, 2011). It was totally a 
                                                
9  The forbiddance of communist party was made by Parliament as reaction on the Soviet coup d'état 
attempt in 1991. This decision was recognised partially illegal by constitutional Court of Ukraine 
27.12.2001. But this action became the reason for including Ukraine to The Transitional Justice Data 
Base Project in the category “Lustration”. 
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new state, with all necessary attributes like a parliament, a president, a government, an 
own flag, a national anthem and diplomatic representatives in other countries. But these 
factors did not ensure a proper transition to a democracy. As Kuzio expressed this, 
“Ukraine inherited a quasi-state with some institutions from the USSR, but these were 
insufficient for an independent state” (Kuzio, 2007, p. 34).  
Due to such tendencies in “the politics of the past”, new state faced a number of 
challenges. There was no clear understanding how to build new governmental 
structures, economical interconnections and social life, how to deal with the past, 
neither among old communists, nor among the opposition. It was the moment, when the 
“new communists” took an initiative. Subsequently, the leader of the opposition party 
Narodny Rukh (“People's Movement of Ukraine”), Mr. Vjacheslav Chornovil, 
expressed regret that “the Ukrainian democrats, especially the leaders of the Rukh, were 
not ready to fulfil its historic mission and voluntarily gave power to the old 
nomenclature” (Дуцик, 2009). 
The deep rooted communist nomenclature in the political life of Ukraine, weakness and 
fragmentation of the opposition and profound structural preconditions of 
underdevelopment of the Ukrainian state contributed to the fact that the first president 
elections in 1991 won the newly formed socialist party with the old communist faces 
and first president – Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine for ideology, 
Leonid Kravchuk. The first years of independence were marked by political inertness 
events and reactions. Politicians were using the "old proven" methods of political 
behaviour and training. First decade of independence, Communists in parliament were 
“dominating and hijacking Ukraine's transition.”(Kuzio, 2007, p. 37) These factors 
could partially explain not just the fact of the lustration ‘failure’ but also, the fact that 
this issue was almost not raised in any social and political discourse.  
As a representative of the early pro-democratic part of Ukrainian electorate, the 
Narodny Rukh was elected into the Verkhovna Rada in the 1989's parliament (very first 
for Ukraine, last in the USSR). At the same time, the political composition of the VR 
was strictly dominated by former (so-called “repainted”) communists. Thus, the idea of 
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lustration could be only weakly voiced in the Parliament. For example, although during 
the second parliament of the VR, Mr. Viacheslav Chornovil, the leader of the Rukh, 
expressed rather bold lustration proposals modelled after the Czech Republic's and 
Slovakia's examples (Chornovil, speach in Parliament, 1996, 1997), his proposals never 
reached the stage of a bill. It should be taken into account that the electronic archive of 
the law submissions in the VR tracked the speeches only starting from the III 
parliament. Hence, it is impossible to say confidently if the Rukh triggered any 
lustration projects into the parliamentary agenda. Some contemporaries like sociologist, 
Yevgen Golovaha, argued in his interview for medias that “in Ukraine this idea looks 
unhealthy” (Самохвалова, 2011). As Eugene Sverstyuk, Ukrainian dissident, puted 
this: “In the Ukrainian political and expert circles for a long time there was, and often 
still is, a made a statement discussion, that the current problems of Ukraine are due to 
the absence of lustration, in the early 90s. But in the Ukraine of that epoch it was 
impossible. First, all the general information [about secret agents], as they say, "who's 
who" was in Moscow, and secondly, with enough effort those who would conduct the 
lustration could do exactly the opposite – they woud discredit honest, thus moving the 
[true] agents of influence out of the game. The implementation of lustration during that 
timewould only complicate the situation. Moreover, Ukraine was not the Czech 
Republic or Poland - we did not have any sectors not covered by the communist 
system“ (Капсамун, 2011).  
The research in media reports shows no active public discussions of the lustration issue, 
with the exception of the ex-dissident milieu and mostly in the context of the experience 
of Ukraine's state-neighbours (Кіпіані, 2011). Presidents and Prime-Ministers did not 
stand up and comment on this question publicly.  
As a result of such asymmetric changes (more symbolic than practical), the state 
structure was developed almost in the same way, as it existed before 1991. The second 
presidential elections were won by Leonid Kuchma with the result of 52 % and next 
parliamentary elections in 1994 were won by recreated Communist party with the best 
result – 28,1%, Rukh on the second place – 27% (Wilson, 2003, p. 214). The similar 
situation developed during the next residential (1999) and parliamentary (1998) 
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elections. The question of lustration was not discussed in the Parliament during this 
period and was almost not featured in the media until the elections of 2002, when the 
block “Our Ukraine” won 23.57% of the parliament seats.  
The first decade of Ukraine independence was marked by the inertia of political 
processes, the gradual acceptance of independence reality, the incipience of symbolic 
level of the state and the change of the “facade”, but essentially not of the change of 
political elites. The political decision to conduct lustration was not made and was even 
discussed extremely rare – it was not simply an issue in the agenda of any political 
force. Thus, structural circumstances of past and present political situation led to the 
failure of the lustration processes after the independence.  
3.2 After the Orange Revolution 
 
The “orange team” came to power after the mass protests against the falsification of the 
presidential elections in 2004. The type and circumstances of this transition was 
different from the events of 1991 – namely, it became more proactive. The structural 
pre-conditions were much more in favour of changes and transitional justice measures 
implementation. Nevertheless, all projects of lustration law failed to be adopted, despite 
multiple submissions and regular discussions in the parliament. 
3.2.1 Changes in Political Structural Conditions 
 
After the parliament elections in 2002, when "Our Ukraine" won the first place, with the 
Communist party coming in second, the democratic opposition obtained a somewhat 
stronger position than in the 90s. However, the situation has changed dramatically only 
with the presidential elections in 2004. Only then the dominance of the restored 
Communist's and “repainted Communists” – Socialists has ended (Kuzio, 2007, p. 44).   
 
The difficulty lies in the nature of Ukrainian politics (Kuzio, 2007, p. 44). Kuzio 
believes that “The opposition is insufficiently strong to overthrow the authorities while 
the regime is insufficiently strong to undertake full scale repression against the 
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opposition” (Kuzio, 2007, p. 44). Still, Kuzio is convinced that it was a “pacted 
transition”, that included negotiated compromises and some sort of “round table 
agreement”, which guaranteed certain “immunity for Kuchma and his elites” and in the 
same time guaranteed that the government forces refrained from violent response to the 
Orange Revolution and to the Yuschenko election” (Kuzio, 2007, p. 44). 
The changes in the state building regulation started in some new way – the new 
appointment for the state positions and somewhat different discourses in the parliament. 
The state made only indecisive steps towards the dealing with the past. For example, the 
new head of the secret services, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko initiated the process of 
Holodomor investigation, which lead to the criminal case in 2009 against Soviet leaders 
in 1932-1933 already long dead 10.  Most of the reforms were slow and “muddled” 
(Kuzio, 2007, p. 45).  
Finally, the issue of the dealing with the post-Soviet path and Kuchmas-era crimes 
became one of the reasons for the breaking of the “Orange Coalition” in 2006. Kuzio 
believes that “weak presidential will, lack of a pro-reform parliamentary coalition and 
government, low institutional capacity, lack of effective strategic planning” (Kuzio, 
2007, p. 45) became the causes of the failing to reach the most of the Orange Revolution 
goals and led to a loss of the Presidential Elections in 2010 and the Parliamentary 
Elections in 2012. 
  
                                                
10  This case became more symbolic measure than actual punishment due to the fact, that most of the 
criminals were dead by that time (Unian.net, 2009). 
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3.2.2 New Elites’ Behaviour 
 
The time of Yushchenko's presidency created a contrast with the two previous leader's 
policies in the matters of transitional justice and revision of the totalitarian past. The 
issues like recognition of the Holodomor11, the foundation of the Institute of National 
Memory12, submission of parliamentary drafts of laws that legally defined the status of 
the concerning the Second World War-time combatants of the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army received broad discussion and media resonance. In terms of theoretical approach, 
according to the classification by Pettai and Pettai (2015, p. 25), these measures can be 
classified as "symbolic-representational.” 
As visible from Table 2, in 2005, during the IV parliament (2002-2006) was the peak of 
the lustration debates in the parliament. Two drafts of lustration laws were submitted 
within a month. First by “Our Ukraine” and “Batkivschuna” (“Motherland”) party 
deputies Chervoniy V. M., Shkil A.V.,  Oleksiyuk S. S. # 7028, and the second - by the 
head of the “Svoboda” (“Freedom”) Oleh Tyahnybok # 7028-2. After the Orange 
Revolution, in addition to the lustration of the communists, the opposition forces 
emphasized the necessity for the so-called “separation of business and power” (Zaets, 
2005). In the lustration projects authored by the “Nasha Ukraina” (“Our Ukraine”) 
deputies one can find two components. The first one is the classical lustration based on 
the example of Czech Republic (Shkil, 2005). The second idea concerns vetting of the 
public service officials to exclude their involvement in the falsification of the 2004 
presidential elections.13 These ideas find their realisation in the norms of a draft, where 
candidates to the state positions were supposed to be checked not only on the question 
of the “communist past”, but also whether they were “not involved in the falsification of 
the Presidential Elections in 2004, political persecution, vote-buying and pressure on 
voters to influence their vote, censorship and the introduction of the media propaganda 
                                                
11  On the 28th of November 2006, the Verkhovna Rada passed a decree defining the Holodomor as a 
deliberate act of genocide. [online] Available at: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/376-16 [Accessed 
19.05.2016] 
12  Institute of National Memory was established 22.05.2006 but did not have the question of 
lustration in its agenda (Soldatenko, 2011). 
13 One of the authors urged in a parliamentary session: “And in order to give a new meaning to this new 
power, one should apply such a thing as lustration” (Shkil,2005) 
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guidelines (“temnyki”) and other violations of the electoral legislation” (Art. 4 of the 
draft of lustration law #7028). 
It should be noted that the initiators of the bill #7028 were relatively inactive lobbying 
their project in the VR. Only one of the authors, Mr. Shkil, spoke in the Parliament 
about lustration on the eve of the project submission. Another tactic was chosen by the 
author of the second bill #7028-2, Oleh Tyahnybok, leader of the party Svoboda 
("Freedom"): in his speeches he was insisting regularly on implementing lustration and 
urged deputies to adopt it on the principles of the three “K” - lustration of communists, 
KGBists (KGB agents and informators) and kuchmysts (supporters of then-President 
Kuchma and the failed candidate Yanukovich)" (Tyahnybok, 2005, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the project #7028-2 contained a ban to occupy some state positions only for ex-
communist leaders, secret agents, their informators, or persons, who were “taking part 
in persecution of Soviet citizens” and contain no clause on taking part in falsifications 
of the Presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 (Tyahnybok, 2005).  
As a counter activity, the then-opposition Partia Regioniv (“The Party of Regions”) and, 
particularly communists, actively played the card of "factual, ongoing illustration" at 
that time. They were emphasizing repeatedly in plenary sessions that there was a 
supposedly wide-spread practice when members of the “orange team”, besides 
promoting a draft law on lustration, already conducted unofficial public officials 
cleansing for their political beliefs. Deputies were claiming, that the representatives of 
local authorities that, during the scandalous 2004's Election openly supported the “blue-
whites” (colours of Yanukovich's party), were fired without any legal reasons 
(Sulkovsky, Pxy`denko, Yeremeyev, 2005). A deputy of the Communist party, 
Solomatin, called political lustration a “forerunner of genocide” (Solomatin, 2005), his 
party comrade Kruchkov compared the above mentioned situation with a “staffing 
tsunami, the actual lustration” (Krychkov, 2005). Nina Karpachova, who was occupying 
the post of Authorized Human Rights Representative of the Verkhovna Rada - 
Ombudsman. In her annual report about human rights in Ukraine she echoed the same 
accusations: “I cannot say today, that despite the public condemnation of the leaders of 
the state, the lustration process at the local level does not continue.” Note that later she 
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disclosed her affiliation with the lustration target group and became a deputy of the 
“Party of Regions”). 
Even with the fact, that the deputies of his own party proposed the project of the 
lustration law to the parliament, and despite his own steps to deal with some aspects of 
totalitarian past, Yushchenko did not fully embrace the idea of lustration 
implementation. "The idea of lustration is good, but it lost momentum of time, and 
today there are very few people who could support it," – he said at a meeting with 
students of the University of Warsaw. “The most successful time for its (lustration) 
application was the beginning of the 90s", today this debate in the Ukrainian political 
circles is "ambiguous" (Yushchenko, 2005). This argument sounds especially odd, as the 
number of post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe were dealing with transitional justice 
issues at very this time.14 His political opponent, leader of the socialist party, 
Oleksander Moroz during public debates claimed, that Yushchenko did not support the 
idea of lustration, because he had read archives of SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) 
and realised how many of his own companions were connected with the KGB 
(Цензор.НЕТ, 2010). The Prime Minister from “Our Ukraine” party, Yuriy 
Yekhanurov, in his report to the parliament answered to the deputies question with such 
words: “I am not supporting lustration. I was a member of the Communist Party of 
Ukraine... As a manager of a building, trust, I [had to be] a member of the Communist 
District Committee. If you look, many of us have been there. I believe that if these 
questions had to be raised, then they had to be raised in the past” (Yekhanurov, 2005). 
As a result of parliamentary elections in 2006, the Party of Regions won the majority of 
places – 186 from 450 deputies; on the second place – Block of Yulia Timoschenko 
(BYT) – 129 deputies; and only on third place – “Our Ukraine” 81 deputies. The “red 
sector” of parliament was represented by SPU (33 members of parliament) and KPU (21 
deputies). Party of Regions united with SPU and KPU and created “Anticrisis 
coalition”. New Prime Minister from “Party of Region” Viktor Yanukovich declared: 
"There will be no lustration of personnel" (Unian, 2006). This parliament was 
disbanded. But new elections in 2007 did not change dramatically places, only a bit the 
                                                
14  For example, Check Republic, adopted law in 90s, and extended  it in 2000 (Stan, 2009, p. 49) 
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number of deputies of each party. This time BYT and “Our Ukraine” created a 
democratic coalition for a short period in 2007. 
As soon as the VI parliament of the VR the term lustration was mentioned by leaders 
and deputies of the opposition political forces mostly in the context of its anti-
corruption component - as a means of fighting corruption, cleaning power from the 
criminal elements, testing of public officials in their practice to get “bribes” (Zaets, 
Gerashchenko, 2010). Such ideas find their embodiment in the new project of Lustration 
Law №5389 (01.12.2009) by deputies Zaets and Dzhorzhyk. In its 4th article, in 
addition to the past cooperation and information with KGB, and other secret services, 
the person was checked on the facts of instigating separatism and violent conflicts, 
disrespect of the state symbols, and, finally, on his/her connections to corruption. Even 
after failing to pass the draft №5389 the idea of fighting corruption with lustration was 
very popular among opposition deputies and is voiced repeatedly in the Parliament 
debates (Yacenyuk, Marty`nenko 2012). 
One more attempt was undertaken, immediately on the penultimate day of this 
parliament, by the same deputies and Davydenko by submitting a proposal #11287 
(02.10.2012). The text of the project was very similar to the previous version, with the 
exception of the anti-corruption formulation – it rephrased to require non-involvement 
in any currently “open prosecution on a corruption-related case”. 
The hope that the Orange Revolution “will mark a radical break with totalitarian past” 
(Рябчук, 2007) was dead and left feeling of disappointment of “wasted opportunities” 
(Kuzio, 2007, p. 42) Orange Revolution was the new “window of opportunity”, but this 
time it was unwillingness of political ruling elites to implement such transitional justice 
measure, as lustration. So far, this time structural condition promoting for lustration, but 
political choices of actors played a crucial role in its failure.  
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3.3 Comparative Summary and Outlook 
 
In the first chapter of this work a theoretical framework was presented, which outlines 
possible factors that explain the reasons why transitional justice measure were, 
implemented in particular countries (Figure 1). As a base, the scheme of Welsh was 
taken and further developed with the findings of such scholars as Williams, Nalepa, 
Grodsky and others. The developed framework consists of two main  groups of factors – 
structural and elites' behaviour, which influence the adoption of a transitional justice 
policy (including lustration) and determine its course. In the case of transition of 
Ukraine, there were no vetting or purging procedures for ex-communists agents and 
collaborators, and there were no lustration law adopted. The developed theoretical 
framework gives a possible answers to the question why lustration happened in EECs. 
In the third chapter the same framework is used to explain why lustration did not 
happen in Ukraine. 
The long-time reign of the totalitarian regime, oppression and persecution of dissidents 
by secret services lead to the structural pre-conditions not in favour of sanctioning 
former KGB agents or informers. Henceforth, no actual transition of power happened –- 
the same old communists forces simply regrouped themselves into new parties. In its 
turn, the opposition was weak and not interested in any rapid changes. In result, no any 
lustration project was submitted to the parliament from 1991 through 2004.  
After the Orange Revolution in 2004, the structural situation has changed – the 
conditions became appropriate for dealing with the communist past: The president 
Yushchenko, promised new changes for the country and breaking ties with the past. For 
the first time, lustration law drafts were submitted and debated in the parliament. Still, 
there was no political will within the elites for cleaning or purging. The president 
backed off, claiming that the time of lustration passed, the prime-minister came out with 
his communist past, and lustration supporters did not collaborate to merge two 
alternative projects of the lustration law. 
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These findings lead to the conclusion that the failure of the Ukrainian political elites to 
adopt lustration measures in the period 1991-2004, as it had been done in the other 
EECs after 1991, can be best explained by structural factors. While some of them still 
apply later, the post-2004 failure to engage in lustration is best explained by using actor-
based factors. 
Metamorphosis of the Term Lustration 
Although the main findings of this study will be presented in the next, concluding part, 
the results of the analysis of the transcripts of VR, such as the transformations of the 
lustration term semantics, should be analysed in a more precise way. Careful analysis of 
the discussions about lustration in the Ukrainian parliament through counting its 
mentions during the parliamentary debates, gave an impression of the divergence of the 
term's understanding among the deputies. Usage of the term and its context were very 
different in different times and sessions. Essentially, lustration is the transitional justice 
measure, calling-purging to deal with the state institutions – clean them from 
collaborators of the previous regime and its secret services. From 1991 through 2004 
democratic deputies did talk about removing communists and KGB agents from the 
state positions, but rather humbly and indecisively. After 2004 the lustration bill drafts 
had one big group added – Kuchma's political companions and everyone, who 
participated in presidential elections falsifications. Already in 2010, lustration started to 
be discussed during parliament debates as the way to fight corruption, oligarchic system 
and the problems with the “family power” of president Yanukovich. Partially, this 
meaning of lustration, as an anti-corruption tool, finds its realisation in the Lustration 
Law of 2014. 
The Lustration Law was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in 2014 after the Maidan 
events in 2013-2014. One of the people's requirements was a total lustration of not only 
the collaborators with secret services of communist regime, but also of the government 
officials, who were responsible for the shootings of peaceful protest on February 18-
19th, 2014; as well as all chiefs of state bodies, who participated in the persecution 
citizens, corruption schemes and illegal actions. The lustration law of the 2014, adopted 
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in the aftermath, was not included in this research for several reasons. First of all, the 
events are temporally too close to the research - too small distance from the past events 
to clearly elaborate and distinguish between the structural conditions and the elites 
actions, which created political situation for the law's adoption. The second reason 
based on the fact, that the anti-corruption component of this law is very strong. This is 
totally different core, different reasons (motivation) and objects, in comparison to the 
previous projects and even to lustration experience in the rest of post-communist EECs. 
The Venice Commission emphasised in their report a few times, that they recommend to 
consider these two components separately – anti-corruption component and lustration of 
communists collaborators (Venice Commission Final Opinion, 2015). 
To sum up, although it could be interesting to trace the changes of the lustration term 
semantics not only among deputies, but also among different groups of society, the 
earlier mentioned reasons suggest to leave out this part of Ukrainian transition history 
for future research. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis was dedicated to the question of the unsuccessful transition of post-Soviet 
Ukraine, especially the failure of its lustration process. A careful review of the 
theoretical frameworks developed by numerous authors in the field of post-communist 
transitional justice, granted the possibility to develop a theoretical framework that 
outlined the key factors that influence whether new elites pursue transitional justice vis-
a-vis oppressors from a previous regime (Form 1). By distinguishing between structural 
or background factors and actor-elite behavioural factors, this thesis traced how these 
factors influenced the Ukrainian political situation, especially the non-implementation 
of lustration. The units of comparison used here were defined as “windows of 
opportunity”, denoting two distinct time periods in recent Ukrainian history when the 
political situation radically shifted - after the proclamation of independence in 1991, and 
after the success of the Orange Revolution in 2004.  
Thus conducting an intra-case comparative analysis and applying the method of 
process-tracing in case study research, this thesis aimed to answer the question: Which 
set of factors influenced political decisions not to adopt lustration adoption in each of 
the two phases, after 1991 and after 2004? 
The findings of this study suggest that the transition of Ukraine from a totalitarian 
regime in 1991 was mostly a reaction to outside events, supported by the majority of 
society, rather than the results of proactive opposition and grassroots movements all 
over Ukraine. Such a transition caused the strong positions of “re-coloured” communists 
and the election former communist leaders as the country’s first two presidents. The 
basis for this was created during decades of Soviet governance of the territory of 
Ukraine: generations of totalitarianism and repression, active and secret services 
pervading every part of society and the decimation of dissident movement. Thus, 
following independence, there were no strong alternatives to former communists, who 
merely changed their party-names and slogans, but retained political habits. Not 
surprisingly, there were no transitional justice measures or lustration attempts in 
parliament, with such structural conditions and background factors in place. The only 
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context in which lustration was mentioned by the democratic opposition in this time was 
the experiences of neighbours conducting such policies at this time. 
The other beginning of the story can be seen after the Orange Revolution in 2004 – the 
change of the power with mass protests and   elections, changes in parliamentary 
composition and the balance of power, clear steps being taken to deal with the 
totalitarian past and two proposed lustration bills in the Rada’s agenda. But the end of 
this story was the same – a divided coalition, failed reforms, dealing with the past on a 
merely symbolic level, and the deaths of lustration bills. This time, however, these 
failures were due to elite unwillingness to deal with the past, and the inability to 
cooperate regarding transitional issues.  
The complex of structural conditions and the behavior of elites led to the failure of 
lustration in Ukraine. Not a single legal act was adopted that involved the purging or 
vetting of former KGB agents in Ukraine until 2014. Even the lustration law passed 
then, while containing a provision to remove from power collaborators with the secret 
services of the Soviet Union, affects only a narrow circle of these people because of the 
time passed after independence and the old age of the persons who would otherwise be 
purged. 
As the empirical examination shows, the semantic meaning of the term lustration has 
changed during the time of transition. Research more focused on this aspect could be 
helpful for better understanding of transitional justice in Ukraine. 
The author admits that this study has certain limitations. There was only one 
measurement of transitional justice in the focus of research and this created a narrow 
view of the overall picture. This thesis is based on both secondary resources (scholars' 
publications and media reports) and on transcripts of parliamentary sessions as primary 
data. However, a more thorough study could have reinforced some of the findings by 
including an analysis of voting results and by undertaking in-person interviews with key 
actors. In conclusion, this study sheds light on the interrelations between structural and 
elite-centric factors in the political evolution of Ukraine after 1991 and 2004. 
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